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Interaction between OHS regulation and OHS certification in Denmark 
By Kåre Hendrikseni, Kirsten Jørgensen and Ulrik Jørgensen,  
Department of Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark 
Abstract 
In 2001, the Danish Parliament approved a law on OHS certification1 that provided economic 
support to enterprises/organizations that were certified according to one of the two national OHS 
standards.2 3 These certified enterprises/organizations were also exempt from the initial inspection 
by the Danish Working Environment Authority, which they would otherwise be required to pay for. 
In practice, this meant that inspection of the certified enterprises was transferred to the certification 
bodies unless a work accident or work-caused ailment or the like was reported. In 2005, the law was 
revised4 so that in practice OHSAS 18001 received the same status as the Danish standards,5 6 
which are presently of no practical importance. A special marking arrangement was also introduced 
for certified enterprises/organizations and shown on the Danish Working Environment Authority’s 
website. 
In spite of the fact that OHS certification has existed as a form of substitute inspection for almost 10 
years, no systematic evaluation of the effects of OHS certification on the OHS, and thereby the 
validity of the certificate, has been made. In several cases, however, certified 
enterprises/organizations have received injunctions, immediate orders, or prohibitions against 
continued operation after the Danish Working Environment Authority had made an inspection due, 
for example, to a reported work accident or a theme campaign. This demonstrates that certification 
does not necessarily ensure that enterprises operate according to the legal requirements. 
This raises the question of whether OHS certification is a proper substitution for inspection by the 
authorities. On the one hand, the control frequency is greater for the certified 
enterprises/organizations due to the audits required for the certificate; on the other hand, the 
certification regime is based on a different frame of reference than the traditional regulation regime 
based on public inspection. These different frames of reference influence the way in which the 
national OHS concept is implemented, and thus the focus of inspection practice. Another significant 
factor is the creation of a client relationship between the certified organizations and the certification 
body, which establishes a form of dependency. 
With point of departure in a project for the Nordic Council of Ministers,7 the discussion here is 
based on Danish experiences and presents the project’s central recommendations for optimizing the 
interaction between OHS certification and regulation/control. 
1 Introduction 
In the Nordic countries, a tradition exists for a relatively restrictive detail regulation of the working 
environment and control by the authorities of OHS performance based on random samples. Among 
OHS professionals, it has been a widely accepted premise that the relatively good Nordic OHS 
performance generally reflects the regulating and controlling focus. Since the end of the 1980s and 
especially throughout the 1990s, a gradual paradigm shift toward increased self-control followed 
the international trend toward new liberalism and the wish for deregulation in order to strengthen 
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enterprises/organizations’ individual and organizational responsibility. At the same time, the 
increasing complexity of the OHS concept has made control by the authorities more difficult and 
more demanding of resources. The paradigm shift has led to a greater emphasis on organizationsi 
taking better care of their OHS, for example through management systems and through their own 
control. This shift is based on the idea that market mechanisms can be used to promote 
improvements, also within such important areas for society as environment, working environment 
and social responsibility. 
As part of the international tendency toward increased focus on self-control, ISO issued the ISO 
1400 environmental standard in 1996, which was relatively quickly followed by EU’s EMAS act. 
Because the ISO committee could not agree on an OHS standard, the British Standard Institution in 
1999 issued OHSAS 18001, which has become a relatively widespread OHS standard 
internationally.  
The increased confidence in the individual organization’s societal and humanistic responsibility 
won sympathy outside traditional right-wing circles and also became anchored in much of the trade 
union movement and social democratic parties. In the different Nordic countries during this period, 
changes were made in OHS legislation, all of which place greater emphasis on the individual 
organization’s self-control through the internal control principle.8 Whereas Denmark, in 2001, 
decided that it was voluntary to establish an OHS management system and gave special legal status 
to organizations that became OHS certified by an accredited certification agency, the other Nordic 
countries maintained control of all organizations by the relevant authority. It is characteristic that 
these changes have been carried out with relative consensus among the interested parties. At 
present, Sweden is considering introducing a practice similar to that in Denmark, under which OHS 
certified organizations are not subjected to control by the authorities.  
2 The different regime frameworks and conditions 
The traditional regulation and control regime and the market-based certification regime have their 
origins in quite different frameworks for regulation. It is therefore necessary to analyze the 
differences in connection with a discussion of their effects on OHS performance. 
2.1 Regulation based on rules and inspection 
In a democratic society, laws and their enforcement are ideally considered to promote the common 
good; the legal rights of the individual are weighed against society’s economic and security 
interests. In this perspective, working environment can be compared with many other aspects of 
society that are subject to public regulation and control, such as the environment and traffic. 
OHS legislation thus recognizes that it is necessary for society to protect the individual employee 
against accidents, wear and tear or abuse, because the individual organization cannot or will not 
necessarily protect employees’ interests and only to a limited extent can meet the costs connected 
with accidents, wear and tear etc. 
The understanding that forms the basis for OHS legislation in the Nordic countries is that ensuring a 
good OHS is important for the functioning of society, and also that the OHS issue is much too 
                                                 
i In this article, we use the OHSAS 18001 definition of organization, which includes: company, corporation, firm, 
enterprise, authority or institution, or part or combination thereof, whether incorporated or not, public or private, that 
has its own functions and administration. 
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complex to be left to the individual organization itself to manage through locally formulated norms 
and demands. Therefore, OHS legislation is characterized by being relatively detailed. The 
framework legislation is approved by the parliament, and the framework is filled out by the relevant 
ministry or authority and implemented through a series of executive orders and guidelines etc.9 
Typical for among others the Nordic countries, the labor market’s organizations are formally 
involved as hearing partners on both the parliamentary and administrative levels in connection with 
drafting regulations. 
The OHS concept is dynamic and is constantly being developed, expanded and defined through 
interaction between the actors in the knowledge network,10 which is for example based on: 
 
• research-based knowledge,  
• the experiences collected through inspection by the authorities,  
• input of knowledge and experience from OHS professionals,  
• known innovation resulting from technological development, and 
• wishes and evaluations of labor market organizations.  
Considerable delays occur, however, from the time this knowledge is documented on the basis of 
research until it is translated into adjustments of the regulations through the issuance of executive 
orders etc. Delays are also due to the tradition for consensus, which aims to achieve agreement 
between the labor market organizations before changes are politically or administratively approved. 
It is noteworthy that opposition to tightening the regulations can come from both the employer and 
employee organizations, and that such opposition most often has the same basis – fear of worsening 
the conditions for competition and thereby losing jobs.   
Thus, several interested parties have direct or indirect influence on the development of both the 
OHS concept and the regulations. The regulations are usually reactive and rarely completely reflect 
researchers’ and OHS professionals’ actual OHS concept, but are rather an expression of the 
political compromise that can be reached at a given point in time.11 Therefore, the actual balance of 
power between the different interested parties influences both the national definition of the OHS 
concept and the regulations. This means that the media and other opinion makers can also exert 
great influence on the definition of the OHS concept in relation to individual cases. 
Viewed in an international perspective, the OHS concept has a broad scope within which the Nordic 
countries represent one of the more holistic, which also includes work-related ailments resulting 
from long exposure as well as ‘soft’ parameters, such as the psychosocial working environment, 
sick leave, and maintaining sick and worn out employees’ connection with the workplace etc. Even 
within EU, several countries have a much more traditional OHS concept, narrowly focused on 
technical protection against accidents etc. The national understanding of the OHS concept is 
reflected in countries’ legislation, which is also based on differing conceptions of objective OHS 
problems. Several Southern European countries, for example, still do not recognize that exposure to 
organic solvents can cause injury to the brain and the central nervous system. The great national 
differences OHS legislation reflect the interaction between the national regulation tradition and the 
balance of power between the many interested parties that influence the definition of the OHS 
concept.  
The regulation and control regime can contribute to ensuring a national minimum standard for OHS 
performance, if the necessary resources are provided for inspection. In this respect, there are also 
great national differences as well as in respect to inspection practice, including how the controlling 
authority interprets and implements the regulations. 
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In the Nordic countries, the regulations are interpreted relatively restrictively, and they are used to 
form the basis for authority control; here, corruption and the like are largely an unknown 
phenomenon. However, resources for the controlling authorities constitute a parameter that is part 
of the political-economic competition in connection with the annual budget. There is a tendency to 
reduce these resources under right-wing governments, whereas they increase under social 
democratic governments. Inspection frequency and thus some of the effect therefore reflects to a 
certain extent the actual political balance of power, just as the development and revision of the 
politically approved legislation is also influenced by the balance of power; however, the aim is to a 
greater extent to achieve consensus in connection with filling out the framework legislation through 
issuing executive orders etc. 
As the OHS concept is gradually expanded, the regulation and control regime is confronted with a 
double challenge. Expansion of the OHS concept to also include long exposures means that it 
comes to cover conditions with individual dosages, which means that it becomes more difficult to 
set objective and unambiguous exposure levels. Inclusion of the psychosocial working environment 
covers conditions in which an individual dosage response has no meaning. In such cases OHS effort 
must focus on how work is organized and human relations are maintained in the organization which 
does relate to how management is performing its rights to organize and lead work activities. It 
therefore becomes increasingly more difficult to develop an unambiguous set of regulations that 
ensure a good working environment within the politically accepted OHS concept. It also becomes 
more complicated to control whether organizations comply with the current regulations. This 
development also leads to an increasing need for inspection resources.  
2.2 The certification regime 
The basis of the certification regime is that organizations implement and maintain a certifiable 
management system, which through internal control ensures a defined level of performance. Both 
the OHSAS 1800112 and ISO 14001 standards are based on the quality standard, ISO 9001, the 
main principle of which is that the producer defines its quality specifications and a certification 
body, using random samples, verifies that the system ensures that the quality specifications are 
fulfilled. This makes it possible for consumers, when choosing a product on the open market, to 
focus on price and other parameters, while certification ensures that quality specifications are 
fulfilled by making them transparent.   
OHSAS 18001 and ISO 14001 differ from the ISO 9001 standard on two points. The first is the 
demand for continual improvements; the second is that the organization is obligated to comply with 
relevant legal requirements in relation to the working environment and the environment. In the 
OHSAS 18001 standard, it is the organization’s management that defines the level and scope of the 
continual improvements.i The standard’s other requirements relate to the planning and structure of 
the organization’s OHS management system.  
The OHSAS 18001 standard’s requirement specifications are defined by an exclusive group of 
interested parties, which primarily includes certifying and accrediting agencies, the industry’s 
interest organizations, and to a less extent OHS professionals, whereas employee organizations and 
OHS research are for the most part not represented.ii The group is self-appointed and members pay 
for their participation. The fee depends, among other things, on whether the member wishes to have 
orientation or hearing rights. It is thus characteristic that the standard’s requirements are defined by 
interested parties whose primary interest is not in the requirements for the working environment but 
in management, systems and certification, and that these elements for most interested parties are 
                                                 
i OHSAS 18001:2007, 4.2 OH&S policy 
ii OHSAS 18001:2007, Acknowledgement 
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also related to their business conditions. The interested parties that typically participate in defining 
the content and scope of the OHS concept, and in some countries participate in developing the 
regulations, for the most part do not participate in the standardization work. They remain invisible 
in the standardization work and function through the standards’ references to OHD and safety, in 
the expectation that their knowledge can be used when the standards are implemented. The 
networks of interested parties that are necessary to maintain and develop this knowledge remain 
hidden in the standard13 – hidden behind vaguely defined concepts.  
The OHS concept reflected by the standard is traditional with focus on elementary technical 
accident prevention. The standard assumes that an objective evaluation can be made of the OHS 
parameters through measurement or verification.i Therefore, the standard does not ensure the 
certification bodies the necessary instruments to audit many of the OHS parameters that are 
gradually included, for example in the Nordic countries’ regulations. 
The only explicit requirement of OHSAS 18001 regarding OHS performance is that it must comply 
with relevant legal requirements.ii Therefore, the standard does not refer to just one but to many 
nationally different OHS concepts, and in the Nordic countries, the more holistic Nordic OHS 
concept. Because the standard is not explicit in relation to OHS performance, it is left to 
organization management to choose the level of performance it will obligate itself to live up to, and 
thereby to select from within the national OHS concept in relation to the framework defined for 
national regulation. This also means that OHS performance for certified organizations in different 
countries is opaque and not comparative.  
3 Comparing the two regimes 
The certification regime has the potential to be more proactive than the regulation and control 
regime, because certification is basically addressed to organizations that choose to pay for this 
service. It can therefore be expected that these organizations aim at a level that fulfils or goes even 
further than the requirements made within the actual OHS concept. Due to the standard’s lack of 
explicit requirements, this requires the individual organization’s management to consciously give 
priority to OHS efforts and provide the necessary economic resources. Because of competition 
many organizations force managers are to give priority to other activities even though they 
personally may wish to focus more on OHS. For this reason it is necessary to reduce market 
incentive to support necessary priorities. Isolated examples also show that systematic emphasis on 
optimizing the OHS performance have contributed to increased productivity that has more than 
outweighed the costs. 
In international trade, there is a tendency for especially larger organizations to demand that their 
suppliers in the third world or eastern Europe document their OHS performance, typically through 
OHSAS 18001 certification. This presents a challenge, however – even a problem – in that the 
standard lacks explicit requirements for OHS performance besides the normative requirement that 
management in its OHS policies is obligated to comply with relevant national legislation. 
As already mentioned, OHS certification comprises an element in the Danish OHS legislation, and 
certified organizations are awarded a crowned smiley (special marking, see the Danish Working 
Environment Authority’s website) and are exempt from the OHS authority’s introductory 
screening.14 This means that OHS certification is an integrated part of the total regulation regime.  
                                                 
i OHSAS 18001:2007, 4.3.3 Objectives and programs 
ii OHSAS 18001:2007, 4.3.2 Legal and other requirements  
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The prerequisite for this has been the expectation that the certification process ensures that certified 
organizations have a good OHS performance and comply with the relevant legal requirements. It 
was also expected that the process would free authorities’ resources for better control of the 
organizations that have the greatest need for it. Finally, it was expected that this special status 
would promote the spread of certification and thus improve OHS performance throughout the labor 
market.15  
To ensure the possibility for comparison between competing organizations’ OHS performance and 
thereby ensure equal competition, and to make the OHS certificate a relevant instrument for 
communication with the authorities and other partners, the standard refers to relevant national 
legislation. Thus, comparability and equal competition only apply for organizations that operate 
under comparable regulations and inspection practice, which is usually only the case within one 
country or perhaps  a region. 
While the regulation and control regime’s point of departure is to protect the common good of 
society, the certification regime is based on business’ need that a given service complies with the 
specifications defined by the supplier. The wish to protect labor power’s societal value and prevent 
accidents, wear and tear etc. is indirectly fulfilled through the standard’s requirements of continual 
improvement and adherence to the relevant legal requirements, as well as some of the requirement 
elements regarding the system’s structure. Therefore, the certification regime’s level of OHS 
performance is inextricably linked with the national OHS concept and the regulations connected 
with it. In a Danish context, it is therefore important to evaluate the significance that OHS 
certification has for the quality of the whole regulation regime.  
3.1 Authority control versus market relationship and inspection frequency 
Authority control of OHS is forced on the individual organization, while certification is a service 
that can be purchased on the market. In Denmark, for example, significant competition exists 
between five certification bodies. This means that a customer relationship exists between the 
organization and the chosen certification body, which can influence the quality of the auditing and 
thereby the validity of the certificate. Examples exist of price dumping, which has had 
consequences for auditing quality, as well as of organizations that shift certification body in order to 
achieve less restrictive auditing.16  
In eg the Nordic countries, a similar customer relationship does not exist between authority and the 
individual organization, because there is a tradition for independence and equality in authority 
control, and corruption is of no practical significance. 
On the other hand, inspection frequency is far greater for certification. In accordance with the 
accreditation standard,i a minimum of one annual audit must be made, whereas the Danish 
inspection authority, it is the goal for the Danish Working Environment Authority in the period 
2005 - 2011 to carry out a screening – and if necessary to follow up by ‘adapted’ inspections – of all 
Danish organizations that have employees17. 
3.2 Significance of the OHS concept 
Although OHS regulation usually expresses a reactive interpretation of the OHS concept that is 
defined by researchers and OHS professionals, among others, the experiences gathered from 
authority control and the formulation of regulations and the interaction this involves contribute 
                                                 
i EN ISO/IEC 17021:2006  Conformity assessment – Requirements for bodies preceding audit and certification of 
management systems (9. General requirements) 
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actively to the dynamic development and expansion of the OHS concept. One very essential aspect 
of these processes is that they are basically transparent and public. 
No similar processes apply to the same extent in relation to OHS certification, primarily because the 
certification bodies are subjected to confidentiality with regard to all information about the certified 
organizations; therefore, such information can only be communicated in very generalized formi.18 
At the same time, certification bodies in the Nordic countries have no tradition for participating as 
interested parties in the networks that create development dynamics through interaction, and they 
have no independent economic incentive to actively participate in this interaction. The expectation 
that OSH certification ensures good performance implies a danger that the concept of working 
environment over time will stagnate indirectly supporting deregulation and lead to less resources 
provided for authority’s control efforts. 19 
3.3 Effect of inspection versus auditing 
Whereas the relationship between regulation and its effect on the working environment are 
relatively well documented and understood in the Nordic countries, the relationship between OHS 
certification and the individual organization’s OHS performance is very poorly understood, and 
several challenges and barriers exist for real research in this area. 20  
On the one hand, it is clear that authority control does not ensure that all organizations’ OHS 
conditions comply with the relevant legal requirements. Both the many injunctions and other forms 
of reaction by the Danish Working Environment Authority, and the many reported work accidents 
and work-connected ailments document that large segments of the Danish labor market experience 
problems with the working environment. On the other hand, it is well documented that authority 
control helps organizations in the right direction and thereby gradually raises the labor market’s 
total OHS performance. The Danish Working Environment Authority also systematically follows 
the organizations with the greatest problems so that either their performance improves or they 
become fazed out of the labor market. 
To begin with, an organization ought first to be able to be certified when the certification body has 
made sure that no conditions exist that could trigger reactions from the controlling authority; 
thereafter, the organization, in accordance with the requirement of continual improvement, ought to 
be able to improve performance so that it complies with the relevant legal requirements. 
Documentation is available that shows that some organizations do live up to this understanding of 
OHS certification’s level of performance.21 22 But, as already mentioned, the Danish inspection data 
documents that a significant share of the certified organizations do not live up to the expectations or 
the legal requirements2324, just as no indications are found that continual improvements and thereby 
progress in the level of performance actually takes place in these organizations.  
3.4 Difference in inspection culture 
The measurable and verifiable indicators that, on the basis of OHSAS 18001, can reveal weaknesses 
in the management system are far from sufficient to expose noncompliance with a holistic OHS 
concept, which includes long-time exposures, psychosocial working environment etc. and thereby 
also parameters without any direct dosage-response relationship. They are therefore not measurable 
and are difficult to verify25. Experience shows that certification bodies, through their audits, often 
find it more difficult to reveal anything about the parameters that are difficult to measure and verify 
than the control authority, and there are several examples where the Danish Working Environment 
Authority has issued injunctions due to just such parameters shortly after an audit. The explanation 
                                                 
i EN ISO/ENC: 17021:2006 (Management of impartiality 5.2.7) 
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is that OHSAS 18001 does not contain requirements that are sufficiently capable in relation to these 
parameters, and that the certification culture is directed precisely toward verifying compliance with 
‘objective’ requirements.26  
It could seem that the quality and method of the Danish Working Environment Authority’s initial 
screening and the certifying agency’s audit are comparable. In both cases, random samples are used, 
and it is not sure that the inspector or auditor has sufficient competence to evaluate the 
organization’s total OHS complexity. Normally, the certifying agency’s audit takes much longer, 
primarily because it must audit the paperwork for the whole system, while there is no great 
difference in the depth and scope of the random samples in relation to the organization’s working 
environment; however, audits are normally made much more often. 
There is a decisive difference in management of the conditions that do not comply with the 
regulations. If the Danish Working Environment Authority observes conditions that do not comply, 
the inspector can use a greater range of reactions, from instructions to injunctions to ensure 
adherence within a given period of time, and to prohibitions against continued operation until 
conditions comply with the regulations. If serious or multiple conditions are found that do not 
comply with the regulations, the Working Environment Authority will make a follow-up, ‘adjusted’ 
inspection, where these conditions are inspected more systematically by one or more inspectors 
with special competence in relation to the relevant area(s). 
If the certification body observes lack of adherence to the regulations, the auditor can make 
notifications or nonconformities that must be remedied through adjusting/revising the OHS 
management system within a given period of time, but no instructions or guidance must be 
provided.i The certification body has the possibility to evaluate, through a follow-up audit, whether 
the necessary system correction has been made and whether it has been implemented and is 
effective. However, the certification body has no possibility for actual sanctions and thus cannot 
halt continued operations, even in life-threatening situations. Also, it is not possible for the 
certifying agency, as a consequence of the accrediting standard’sii confidentiality clause, to report 
lacking adherence to the regulations – not even in life-threatening situations – to the Working 
Environment Authority. The only real sanction possible is to suspend the certificate, which rarely 
happens in practice; here, the customer relationship probably plays a role. 
Another decisive difference is how the result of authority control versus certification body auditing 
is interpreted. On the basis of its random sample audits, the certification body evaluates to what 
extent the organization’s OHS management system is well functioning and well implemented. 
Unless such serious violations are found that the certificate is suspended, the auditors conclude on 
the basis of the certificate alone that the organization on the whole, and regardless of the number of 
localities, complies with the relevant legal requirements; thus, the organization is basically exempt 
from authority control. The Working Environment Authority, however, in connection with an 
inspection will never go further than to conclude that the actual inspection revealed no conditions 
that justified an injunction or other reaction, and the organization will never be exempt in advance 
from further inspection. 
3.5 Concluding the comparison of the regimes 
Below is a schematic comparison of the regulation and control regime and the certification regime 
on the basis of their basic characteristics. 
                                                 
i EN ISO/ENC: 17021:2006 (Management of impartiality 5.2.7).  
ii EN ISO/ENC: 17021:2006   (4.6 Confidentiality) 
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Parameter Regulation and control Certification 
OHS concept Defined in interaction between primarily national 
interessed parties. Experiences from inspections 
and the formulation of regulations can contribute 
proactively to developing the OHS concept. 
Refers indirectly to the national OHS concept. Can 
potentially be proactive in relation to interpretation of 
the OHS concept. 
Usually reactive in relation to the OHS concept, as 
defined by e.g. researchers and consultants. 
Leaves it to organization management to choose 
which elements it should be evaluated in relation to. 
Due to confidentiality clauses, the certifying process 
does not contribute proactively to development of the 
OHS concept.  
Basis for 
requirements 
Political compromise on the basis of hearings of 
national interested parties. 
Only reference to general concepts that are not  
defined. 
Usually reactive in relation to the existing OHS 
concept. 
No explicit requirement for OHS performance 
besides complying with relevant national legislation. 
Inspection 
frequency 
Planed screenings and if necessary ‘adapted’ 
inspections in the period 2005-2001 
Audit minimum once a year 
It takes many years before all organizations are 
inspected. 




Control of random samples of the concrete working 
environment, where more thorough inspection  
focuses on problem areas. Also includes the ‘soft’ 
parameters. 
Control of random samples of the management 
system for adherence to the standard’s requirements 
and that it is well implemented.. 
When using random samples, serious problems can 
be missed. 
When using random samples, serious problems can 
be missed. 
Interpretation of 
the result and the 
forms of reaction 
The inspection report describes what has been 
evaluated; it is never concluded whether the 
organization as a whole complies with the legal 
requirements. There can be given injunctions or 
prohibition against continued operation; for less 
serious conditions, instructions. 
Violations are reported to management with a 
deadline for correcting the failures in the 
management system. This also includes eventual lack 
of compliance with legal requirements. 
 No real possibilities for sanctions if conditions are 
observed that do not comply with legal requirements. 
No possibilities to give advice or instructions. 
Organization’s 
learning from the 
reactions 
Receive guidance from the control authority and 
can be ordered to use external consultants. 
Built-in learning process in the organization. 
The organization does not necessarily learn from 
injunctions but can focus only on legalization.  
Certifying  agency does not necessarily follow up 




Professional OHS competence in relation to the 
focus of control. 
Primarily system competence, even though the audit 
demands professional OHS expertise. 
Can lack competence in relation to other areas.  Rarely sufficient competence to audit the 
organization’s total complexity. 
 
This comparison illustrates the great differences in both the scope and degree of enforcement of the 
regulations in the two regimes, which leads to a concluding discussion of the possibilities for these 
two regimes to supplement each other and eventually also to become coordinated in such a way that 
they formally support each other. 
4 Conclusion and discussion 
The certification regime is based on another frame of reference than the regulation and control 
regime. The two regimes differ in their focus and practice, and this influences their respective 
strengths and limitations, even though their aim is the same – to improve organizations’ OHS 
performance. 
The Danish Working Environment Authority is limited in its work by the resources assigned to it. 
This affects control frequency, but the authority has a broad range of reaction possibilities and can 
also advise organizations. In the case of serious violations or life-threatening situations, it can 
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prohibit continued operations immediately and report the organization to the police. With far more 
frequent audits, the certification body can only come with comments or nonconformities to be 
corrected through correction of the system within a specified period of time. In especially serious 
cases, the certificate can be suspended. This means in practice that certified organizations, if they do 
not learn from the nonconformities, can continue violating the law for years without suffering any 
consequences. 
The relation to the OHS concept differs. Whereas the certification regime, due to its confidentiality 
requirement and its closed culture, does not contribute to development of the concept and thereby 
over time weaken the concept, the regulation and control regime contributes, in spite of its usually 
reactive interpretation, to the gradual expansion of the concept. Due to both the interpretation of the 
OHS concept and the system focus and culture, the certification bodies find it extremely difficult to 
audit the parameters that are difficult to measure and verify. The control authority is better equipped 
to manage these parameters, because it to a higher degree uses a dialogue-based approach and can 
choose from a broader range of sanctions. But also for the control authority, management of the 
‘soft’ parameters is a challenge.  
Based on Danish experience, OHS certification has not proved to be an especially appropriate 
instrument to substitute for authority control and to independently ensure compliance with the 
relevant regulations. However, due to its system focus, OHSAS 18001 is a good instrument for the 
organizations that really wish to use it to ensure good OHS management and proactive working 
environment efforts. Thus, certification can be considered a good supplement to generally optimize 
OHS performance on the labor market. Men effekten for den enkelte organisation afhænger helt af, 
i hvilken udstrækning topledelsen kommitter sig til at systemet skal bidrage til en løbende ændring 
og udvikling af ledelseskulturen, og afsætter de nødvendige ressourcer hertil, samt i hvilken 
udstrækning systemet er forankret i hele organisationen og medarbejderne reelt er inddraget.27 28 
This raises the question of how OHS certification can best be used as an instrument for improving 
the total national (and international) OHS performance, and whether and how it should eventually 
be included as an element in the regulations. On the basis of the Nordic Council of Ministers’ 
project29 and the Danish Working Environment Authority’s inspection data for certified 
organizations, it cannot be recommended that OHS certification be used as an actual control 
element, but due to its potential capacity to optimize the individual organization’s systematic OHS 
efforts, its development should be promoted. 
The Nordic Council of Ministers’ project recommends that some more precise guidelines should be 
formulated regarding how the OHSAS 18001 standard should be used and interpreted in the Nordic 
context. It is important to note that among the certification bodies there is support for such 
guidelines, partly to ensure more equal competition and partly to prevent further increase in the 
observable lack of public confidence in certification. In addition, some of the certification bodies’ 
auditors endorse to eliminate the exemption of organizations from the Working Environment 
Authority’s initial screening that is in effect in Denmark, because they fear that negative examples 
that show that certified organizations do not comply with legal requirements will undermine 
confidence in certification and thus their business reputations.   
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